India and Bangladesh share a 4096 km-long border. Of this, 180 kms lies along the river line. The delimitation of the Indo-Bangladesh border is not complete as a 6.5km stretch near Comilla on the Tripura border is yet to be demarcated. A dispute exists between the two countries along various sections of the border. Consequently, unprovoked firing along the border continues, and escalates occasionally to draw the attention of higher administrative levels.
Issues in contention:
The major bone of contention is the adverse location of enclaves. There are 111 Indian enclaves (locally known as Chits) in Bangladesh territory covering 17,258.24 acres. And there are 51 Bangladesh enclaves in Indian territory, measuring 7,083.72 acres. Of these disputed enclaves, 65 are along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border (35 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh territory and 31 in reverse).
The border between Bangladesh and India is defined along fixed lines. In some cases, they pass through the middle of common rivers. It is a misconception that if the river shifts, then the line separating the two countries will also move, conforming to the centerline of the common river. Thus, if the river erodes on the Indian side, people living on the Bangladesh side think that they have the right to occupy and use the newly accreted land contiguous to Bangladesh. In fact, this land belongs to India. Consequently, conflicts break out between border communities living on both sides of these shifting common rivers. Examples of this type of dispute are found when the Ganges river shifts its course in a random manner leading to disputes about the newly formed island (locally called a Char).
Similarly, a river eroding on the Bangladesh side leaves a part of Bangladeshi land contiguous to India and leads to a dispute. The Kusiyara river (a branch of the Barak river in India) erosion case is an example of this type of problem. Disputes of this nature include Ichamati, Gumti, Feni, Muhuri rivers etc.
Another problem is that some areas on the Indian side, when studied demographically, are revealed as actually belonging to Bangladesh. For example there are same football grounds along the border where one goalpost is on the Indian side and the other on the Bangladesh side.
The residents of the disputed enclaves suffer from a serious identity problem. Neither country acknowledges these residents as nationals nor do they bestow upon them voting and other rights. These people are therefore stateless.
History
The problem of enclaves is a legacy of the dissipated life styles of the rulers of two former princely states – Cooch Behar in North Bengal and Rongpur in South Bengal (present day Bangladesh). The Rajas of the two princely states routinely staked pieces of their estates over a game of cards, and thus came to acquire pockets of land in each other’s territory. The lands were pledged on a piece of paper known as ‘chits’ and hence, these lands are still called ‘chits’. The ownership of these enclaves devolved upon India and East Pakistan after partition in 1947. Sir Cyril Radcliffe drew the dividing line as the parties involved failed to arrive at any agreed border. He was concerned with not disturbing the ‘railway communications and river systems’ rather than the issue of enclaves.
This issue was not resolved till 1971, when East Pakistan became Bangladesh, and inherited the problem. The residents of these enclaves were initially free to move to their respective mainland. But an increase in tensions between India and Pakistan led to this movement being restricted, and problems arising in trade and transit. There has been no administration in these enclaves for the last 50 years. Hence, no police, no revenue, no taxation, and no government services are available. Over the years, the Bengali Muslims in the enclaves in India have migrated to other parts of the state (West Bengal), and the Hindus in the Indian enclaves inside Bangladesh have migrated to India.
| Indira Mujib Treaty of 1974 |
| The Indira Mujib Treaty was signed between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1974, to ensure a comprehensive settlement of outstanding border issues like Bangladeshi citizens’ access to an enclave through a corridor called Tinbigha, transfer of enclaves, demarcation of six and a half kilometers of land boundary (mainly at Muhirchar), and sea and maritime boundaries and ‘adverse possession’. It has been agreed by both sides that no construction can be done within 30 yards of the no man's land or 150 yards from the zero line of the boundary. |
India believes that the porous border with Bangladesh has an adverse impact on internal security. It became more visible since the 1980s with growing foreign support to insurgencies in north-eastern India. Easy passage across the border has facilitated guerilla tactics of the armed outfits which have their camps in foreign territory. Of equal concern to the security of the nation is the problem of massive influx of illegal migrants. Even a cursory look at official statistics reveals that India is facing the brunt of the demographic explosion taking place in the world’s most densely populated country – Bangladesh. The impact in the north-east has already assumed alarming proportions. The threat to internal security from the unabated immigration can hardly be exaggerated. Various districts have undergone considerable changes in terms of demographic composition. Such shifts in the local demographic balance poses an increased risk of violent conflicts between communities, and its probability is even higher in the north eastern region where resources are scarce.
Bangladesh’s Perception:
Bangladesh has been demanding a number of measures from India to mitigate the border problem. They are:
• Ensure free movement of enclave people;
• Permit exchange of enclave people;
• Undertake necessary measures for demarcation of the border line;
• Refrain from pushing Bengali speaking Indian nationals into Bangladesh territory;
• Adopt methods to check violation of the border by Indian civilians and BSF members;
• Ban smuggling of Phensidyl (an intoxicating chemical) and drugs;
• India should ratify the Indira-Mujib Agreement (1974) to facilitate the demarcation of the remaining part of the border.
CURRENT STATUS:
Indian and Bangladeshi border troops, known as Border Security Force (BSF) and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) respectively, have exchanged fire a number of times in the past. Those incidents centred on Muhurichar Island further to the south. Conflicting claims to ownership of this river island provoked gunfire in 1975, 1979 and 1985.
However, the clashes that broke out in the April of 2001 were by far the most serious in the history of Indian-Bangladeshi relations.
According to the Bangladesh government, ever since Indian military intervention during the 1971 war with Pakistan, Indian forces have occupied a small sliver of land along the border near the village of Pyrdiwah. On April 18 2001, BDR troops occupied the disputed village. In the fighting that followed, 15 members of India's BSF were killed, along with several of the attacking soldiers. Indian forces responded and retook the village. Between 10,000 and 20,000 villagers living in the area fled the fighting, with at least 17 suffering wounds. The combat remained limited to the border troops of the respective nations, though mortars were used in addition to automatic weapons fire. Several villages were destroyed or heavily damaged in the fighting.
The demarcation of the unmarked 6.5kms of the border has been pending because of the concerns of the Hindu population living in the lands likely to go to Bangladesh after demarcation. Land will have to be found to resettle them before the final demarcation. Since West Bengal, Assam and Tripura (the three states having a common border with Bangladesh) have no surplus land, this is difficult to resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.
The Bangladeshi officials maintain that the absence of ratification of the 1974 treaty by India is the root cause of the disputes along the 4096 km-long border between India and Bangladesh. While Bangladesh claims that it is prepared to complete the demarcation work, India has kept this dispute alive under various pretexts. India has not ratified the agreement on the plea that the demarcation of the border had not yet been completed.
Origion
The Ganges River originates in People's Republic of China, passing through Nepal and India, forms a boundary of 128 km between India and Bangladesh, then flows 112 km in Bangladesh taking the name Badhma, before joining the Jamuna-Brahmaputra. Afterwards it joins the Meghna River before the combined flows empty into the Bay of Bengal.
For nearly a quarter century, the sluices of the barrage at Farakka, close to the India-Bangladesh border, have been one of South Asia's trickiest diplomatic disputes.
The river divides into two main streams at Farakka, one flowing southwards to the eastern Indian port of Calcutta and the other eastward to Bangladesh. The barrage aims to ensure enough water in the south flowing tributary to keep one of India's main foreign trade ports navigable during the dry pre-monsoon months.
Despite an agreement on sharing the dry season flows at Farakka, India and Bangladesh continue to squabble over what many consider to be the region's richest natural resource.
The surrounding countryside is covered with lush green paddy farms and water bodies teeming with fish. The Ganges and its Himalayan tributaries have blessed the plains of north India and Bangladesh with farm abundance, giving huge profits to landlords, agribusiness corporations and major food exporters.
This is why years of diplomatic negotiations and various accords on sharing the river water have failed to fully satisfy Bangladesh where the Farakka barrage fires political passions.
The dispute centres on differing views about the negative effect of the barrage on farming, fisheries and industry in Bangladesh and ways of boosting the lean season flow of the Ganges at Farakka.
Farakka typifies the deepening water crisis in South Asia which can worsen hunger and cause widespread economic loss in the region unless riparian governments show greater maturity in tackling differences over water sharing, say experts.
History
| Timeline | |
|---|---|
| 29 Oct 1951 | Pakistan first calls Indian attention to reports of Indian plans to build a barrage at Farakka to divert Ganges water to Calcutta Bay. India responds that the project was only under preliminary investigation. |
| 28 June 1960 | Meetings commence at level of "expert" between Pakistan and India to exchange data on regional projects. |
| 1960-1968 | Experts level meetings continue; there are five in all, most focusing on data issues. |
| 30 Jan 1961 | India informs Pakistan that construction had begun on the Farakka Barrage. |
| 1968-1970 | Five meetings continue at the level of secretary. Fundamental disagreements over approaches to Ganges development and the data required to make policy decisions. |
| 1970 | India completes construction of Farakka Barrage. |
| 1971 | Bangladesh comes into being, replacing eastern Pakistan. |
| Mar 1972 | India and Bangladesh establish Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, specifically excluding issues of Ganges development. |
| 16 May 1974 | Prime ministers of India and Bangladesh sign a declaration agreeing to find a mutually acceptable solution to Ganges development, and to turn the question of the best way of supplementing Ganges flow over to the Joint Rivers Commission. |
| 16 Apr 1975 | The two sides agree to a limited trial operation of the Farakka Barrage. India continues to divert Ganges water after the trial run, without renewing or negotiating a new agreement with Bangladesh. |
| June 1975-June 1976 | Meetings continue, with little result. |
| Jan 1976 | Bangladesh lodges a formal protest against India with the United Nations, which adopts a consensus statement encouraging the parties to meet urgently, at the level of minister, to arrive at a settlement. |
| 5 Nov 1977 | Ganges Waters Agreement signed, covering allocation of Ganges water between the two riparians for a period of five years. No long-term solution was found within that time frame. |
| Oct 1982 | Joint communiqué issued, pledging to resolve Ganges issues within 18 months, a task not accomplished. |
| 22 Nov 1985 | Memorandum of understanding issued, on the sharing of Ganges dry season flow through 1988. When accord lapses, no new agreement is signed. |
Attempts at Conflict Management:
When India announced in 1951 that it planned to build the Farakka Dam, Pakistan protested its construction. Pakistan, at the same time, offered that the planning of the utilization of the "shared resources" be made by a UN body and that the subject matter be examined by the experts of both countries. These proposals were not accepted by India and the construction of the Farakka Dam started in 1961 and was completed in 1970. The matter of the allocation of the transboundary waters was negotiated between India and Pakistan until Bangladesh gained its independence in 1971.
By March 1972, the governments of India and Bangladesh had agreed to establish the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, "to develop the waters of the rivers common to the two countries on a cooperative basis." The question of the Ganges, however, was specifically excluded, and was to be handled only between the two prime ministers.
The prime ministers of India and Bangladesh met in New Delhi on 12-16 May 1974 and, in a declaration on 16 May 1974, they:
• observed that during the periods of minimum flow in the Ganges, there may not be enough water for both an Indian diversion and Bangladeshi needs;
• agreed that during low flow months, the Ganges would have to be augmented to meet the requirements of the two countries;
• agreed that determining the optimum method of augmenting Ganges flow should be turned over to the Joint Rivers Commission;
• expressed their determination that a mutually acceptable allocation of the water available during the periods of minimum flow in the Ganges would be determined before the Farakka project is commissioned.
In a series of five Commission meetings between June 1974 and January 1975, and one minister-level meeting in April 1975, the positions of the two sides coalesced into the following:
Bangladesh Position:
• There is adequate storage potential of monsoon flow in the Ganges Basin for Indian needs;
• There is additional storage along the headwaters of the Ganges tributaries in Nepal, and that country might be approached for participation;
• A feeder canal from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges is both unnecessary and would have detrimental effects within Bangladesh, not least of which would be massive population resettlement;
• Indian needs would be better met through amending the pattern of diversion of Ganges water into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, and constructing a navigation link from Calcutta to the sea via Sunderban.
India Position:
• Additional storage possibilities in India are limited, and not sufficient to meet Indian development needs;
• The most viable option both to supplement the low flow of the Ganges, and for regional development, is a link canal and storage facilities on the Brahmaputra, to be developed in stages for mutual benefit;
• Approaching Nepal or other third countries is beyond the scope of the Commission, as is discussing amending the pattern of diversion into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly;
• Constructing a separate navigation canal is not connected to the question of optimum development of water resources in the region.
In January 1976, Bangladesh lodged a formal protest against India with the General Assembly of the United Nations which, on 26 November 1976, adopted a consensus statement encouraging the parties to meet urgently at the ministerial level for negotiations, "with a view to arriving at a fair and expeditious settlement." Spurred by international consensus, negotiations re-commenced on 16 December 1976. At a 18 April 1977 meeting, an understanding was reached on fundamental issues, which culminated in the signing of the Ganges Waters Agreement on 5 November 1977.
The Ganges Water Agreement 1977:
In principle, the Ganges Water Agreement covers:
1. Sharing the waters of the Ganges at Farakka, and,
2. Finding a long term solution for augmentation of the dry season flows of the Ganges.
Specific provisions, described as not establishing any general principles of law or precedent, include (paraphrased):
Art. I. The quantum of waters agreed to be released would be at Farakka.
Art. II. The dry season availability of the historical flows was established from the recorded flows of the Ganges from 1948 to 1973 on the basis of 75% availabilities. The shares of India and Bangladesh of the Ganges flows at 10-day periods are fixed, the shares in the last 10-day period of April (the leanest) being 20,500 and 34,500 cusec respectively out of 55,000 cusec availability at that period. In order to ensure Bangladesh's share in the event of any lower availability at Farakka, Bangladesh's share should not fall below 80% of the stated share in a particular period shown in a schedule annexed to the agreement.
Art. III. Only minimum water would be withdrawn between Farakka and the Bangladesh border.
Art. IV-VI. Provision was made for a Joint Committee to supervise the sharing of water, provide data to the two governments, and submit an annual report.
Art. VII. Provisions were made for the process of conflict resolution: The Joint Committee would be responsible for examining any difficulty arising out of the implementation of the arrangements of the Agreement. Any dispute not resolved by the Committee would be referred to a panel of an equal number of Indian and Bangladeshi experts nominated by the two governments. If the dispute is still not resolved, it would be referred to the two Governments which would, "meet urgently at the appropriate level to resolve it by mutual discussion and failing that by such other arrangements as they may mutually agree upon."
Outcome:
By the end of the five year life of the agreement, no solution had been worked out.
In the years that followed, both sides and, more recently, Nepal, have had years of greater and less success at reaching towards agreement. Since the 1977 accord:
• A joint communiqué was issued in October 1982, in which both sides agreed not to extend the 1977 agreement, but would rather initiate fresh attempts to achieve a solution within 18 months -- a task not accomplished.
• An Indo-Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 22 November 1985, on the sharing of the Ganges dry season flow through 1988, and establishing a Joint Committee of Experts to help resolve development issues. India's proposals focused on linking the Brahmaputra with the Ganges, while Bangladesh's centered on a series of dams along the Ganges headwaters in Nepal.
• Although both the Joint Committee of Experts and the Joint Rivers Commission met regularly throughout 1986, and although Nepal was approached for possible cooperation, the work ended inconclusively.
• The prime ministers of Bangladesh and India discussed the issue of river water-sharing on the Ganges and other rivers in May, 1992, in New Delhi. Each directed their ministers to renew their efforts to achieve a long-term agreement on the Ganges, with particular attention to low flows during the dry season. Subsequent to that meeting, there has been one minister-level and one secretary-level meeting, at which little progress was reportedly made.
The Ganges River Treaty 1996:
The Ganges River Treaty has as its principal objective the determination of the amount of water to be released by India to Bangladesh at the Farraka Barrage for a period of 30 years. It fills the gap left when the 1977 agreement lapsed and is based generally on the 1985 accord.
The 1996 treaty establishes a new formula for sharing the Ganges waters at Farraka in the dry season (1 January to 31 May), providing also that below Farakka the waters are not to be reduced further except for "reasonable use" in a limited amount. The new arrangement is as follows:
if the Ganges flow at Farraka is 70,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs) or less, both countries are to receive 50%; with a flow of between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs Bangladesh receives 35,000 cusecs and India receives the rest; with a flow of more than 75,000 cusecs or more India receives 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh receives the balance.
Further provision is made for the situation where the flow falls below 50,000 cusecs. The sharing arrangements are to be reviewed every five years and if no agreement can be reached on adjustments, India is to release at least 90% of Bangladesh's share.
The Bangladesh-India Treaty makes reference to a number of guiding principles. It aims to make "optimum utilisation" of the waters of the region, bringing a "fair and just" solution to the Farraka waters problem but without establishing "any general principles of law or precedent". It provides for application of the principles of "equity, fair play and no harm to either party" to emergency situations, future adjustments of the Treaty, and the conclusion of agreements for other rivers.
Current Status
Under a mammoth river-linking scheme, India plans to connect 37 rivers, including the Ganges and Brahmaputra, by digging canals to divert major common river waters to its drought-prone states. Bangladesh's Water Resources ministry says the scheme will severely hit Bangladesh, which depends on the two major rivers for 85 per cent of its surface water supplies during the dry season.
For a long time, Bangladesh has expressed a desire to be involved in every phase of the inter-linking project, so that it is not lumped with the consequences – consequences that it claims will severely hit its water-flow, environment and agriculture.
Marking a significant breakthrough in relations between the two countries, the Joint River Commission (JRC) talks between India and Bangladesh were held in September 2003, whereby India agreed to involve its neighbour in future discussions on the US $200 billion controversial river-linking project.
The ministerial-level meeting, held after a gap of three years, also focused on Dhaka’s demand for a breakthroughs in talks over water-sharing arrangements on seven trans-boundary rivers in the region, along the lines of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty signed by the two countries in 1996.
India said such treaties require expert-level investigations, but it agreed to inform Bangladesh in advance about the diversion of water flow of common rivers from northeastern India to water-deficient areas in the southwest.
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